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One of the myths about India’s growth experience is that the services sector can provide 
the impetus to sustain rapid and inclusive growth. Given the size of our workforce, the 
numbers engaged in low productivity jobs in the informal sector and the number entering 
the working population, it is clear that both manufacturing and agriculture will have to 
play an increasing role in generating employment intensive growth.  It is in this context 
that this paper by Professor Krueger makes an important contribution. I am sure that 
readers will find that its policy recommendations are sharply focused on some of the 
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Though recent economic growth in India has increased productivity and living standards 
significantly, the need for more growth and more reform remains.  Rapid growth of 
unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing combined with growth of productivity in 
agriculture is necessary to enable a more inclusive growth that raises living standards in 
rural areas and in non-agricultural employment of relatively unskilled labor.  India’s 
comparative advantage in services does not preclude the need for a rapid-manufacturing-
growth phase of development due to the service sector’s low contribution to output and 
its demand for educated and skilled, as opposed to unskilled, workers.  The failure of 
manufacturing output and employment to grow more rapidly can be attributed to (1) 
regulations governing enterprises in the private sector and (2) regulations covering 
conditions of employment of labor.  Reducing the barriers to entry of unskilled labor into 
manufacturing and relaxing some of the most restrictive labor laws would increase 
prospects for even faster growth than current high rates.  
  




Anne O. Krueger 
1. Introduction
  India’s growth performance and economic prospects have been transformed over the 
past fifteen years. The number of positive developments is huge. By the beginning of the 21
st 
century, India’s rate of economic growth was already among the ten highest in the 
developing world. And, since 2000, growth has accelerated even further. Revised data for the 
year 2005-06 indicate that the growth rate exceeded 9 percent, so that the average rate of 
growth has been around 8 percent over the past four years. Poverty rates were already 
estimated to have fallen significantly in the l990s; and the rapid growth of recent years surely 
has been accompanied by further reductions in absolute poverty, although data are not yet 
available for more recent years (see Dutt and Ravallion 2002 for a survey of the impact of 
growth on poverty). 
  India’s accelerated growth rate, and with it the higher productivity of the economy 
and improved living standards, is a cause for celebration. After the decades prior to 1980, 
when growth of per capita income was little over 1 percent annually, the marked upward shift 
                                                 
1 Paper to be presented at India Conference, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 
June 7-9 2007. The research for this paper was primarily undertaken when I was a visiting 
professor at  ICRIER in January-February 2007. I am grateful Rajiv Kumar for  all his 
support and to Ali Mehdi for valuable research assistance. T.N. Srinivasan made extremely 
useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper; neither he nor ICRIER is responsible for 
the views expressed herein. 
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in the rate – to over 4 percent per annum (and 7 percent in 2005-6) has been dramatic. 
Observers who earlier referred to rapid growth in China and Southeast and East Asia now 
routinely add India to the list of rapidly growing countries. The term “BRICs” (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) is often used to indicate the new and significant role these emerging 
economies play in the international economic system. 
  And, just as there can be no doubt about the successful and dramatic acceleration of 
growth in India, there is no question but that major reforms in economic policy, first 
relatively mild in the 1980s, and then much more dramatic in the 1990s, were a key 
ingredient for that success.
2
  Some believe that the reforms already undertaken have laid the basis for sustained 
growth, which will continue and possibly even accelerate. Certainly, there is good reason to 
believe that growth will continue at rates significantly above those realized in the first quarter 
century of growth after 1947 (see Table 1). And, noting the enormous success of Indian 
software, back-office-processing, and other service industries, some have even suggested that 
Indian growth is and will continue to be unusual in that India was, in significant part, able to 
“skip”, or “jump over” the usual stage that comes when the manufacturing sector’s relative 
importance rises in the growth process. 
                                                 
2 See Acharya, 2006, for an account of the reforms. 
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Table l. Growth of Major Macroeconomic Aggregates, 1951/52 to 2005-6 
    (average  percent  per  year) 
      1951/52-   1961/62-    1971/2-    1981/82-    1992/93-     2000/01- 
      1960/61     1970/71     1980/81    1990/91     2000/01       2005/06 
 
Agriculture                      3.1    2.5     1.8    3.6         3.2          2.1 
Industry                           6.3               5.5           4.1               7.1              6.4          6.9 
Services                           4.3               4.8           4.4               6.7              7.8          8.0 
GDP (factor cost)           3.9                3.7           3.2               5.6              6.1          6.3 
Per Capita GDP              2.0                1.5           0.8               3.4              4.1          4.6  
 
Sources: Acharya, 2006, P. l82 for years to 2000/01; and Government of India, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Survey 2005-2006 for 2000/01-2005/6, P. 4. The average for the 6 years 
is the simple average of the annual growth rates. 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence, and argue, that stunning as India’s 
success is, the potential – and need – is for still more reform and more rapid growth. 8 
percent is a good rate of growth, but many are destined needlessly to be left behind for years 
to come if current trends persist: if growth in output and employment of unskilled-labor-
intensive manufacturing industries remains on its current trajectory, India is at risk of 
bifurcating the economy, with those benefiting from growth and those left out. While 
services output and employment have grown rapidly, the failure of manufacturing output and 
employment to grow more rapidly has left too many bottled up in the rural sector. That has 
resulted in a slower rate of farm consolidation than might have occurred, and in slower 
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growth of overall labor productivity than would have taken place if the shift of low-
productivity marginal farmers to unskilled-labor-intensive manufacturing jobs had been more 
rapid. 
  There is a “missing middle”: rapid growth of unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing 
which, combined with more rapid growth of productivity in agriculture (which would in part 
automatically result from more rapid shifting of workers to labor-intensive manufacturing), 
would enable a more inclusive growth with accelerated increases in living standards in rural 
areas and in non-agricultural employment of relatively unskilled labor. 
  While attention has naturally focused on the great Indian successes to date, the 
transformation started from a very low base. Huge numbers still live in poverty. Almost 60 
percent of the population still resides in rural areas, and probably more than half depend on 
agriculture for their major source of income. Then, too, growth itself is naturally creating 
strains: everyone is aware of the pressures on power, transport, and other infrastructural 
capacity. There are urgent calls for upgrading the skills of the labor force and the quality of 
education at all levels. And, much as many reforms have been undertaken, there are still 
many remnants of the old command-and-control system. 
  Optimists in India rightly point to the country’s enormous potential. Among India’s 
important economic assets is the so-called “demographic dividend”: India’s labor force will 
still be rising, and the burdens of supporting the aged will not be significantly increasing for 
the next several decades. That stands in sharp contrast to the industrial countries, to China, 
and to most of East Asia. But to turn the “demographic dividend” into an actual advantage 
will require measures to enable the Indian economy to increase productive employment for 
unskilled labor at a much more rapid rate than it has done, even since the reforms. 
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  A first section briefly reviews the overall economic performance of the Indian 
economy, highlighting the existence of the missing middle. A second section then examines 
the factors that seem to account for the failure of unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing to 
grow more rapidly. A final section then outlines some of the problems that would be 
ameliorated if unskilled labor-intensive jobs grew at rates comparable to those experienced 
by other labor-abundant countries in their early stages of growth. 
2. Indian Economic Growth
  When one hears discussion of India as a successful rapidly-growing emerging market 
today, it is hard to remember how poor people were when India attained independence. The 
country was 80 percent agricultural, and per capita incomes were among the lowest in the 
world (far below levels of most African countries). There was little industry, and it 
represented a small fraction of economic activity – about 13 percent in 1950/51. Savings 
were around 5 percent of GDP, and exports consisted almost entirely of agricultural 
commodities, while imports were the main source of manufactured goods both for 
consumption and for investment. 
  Indian economic growth is usually divided into several periods. Three stand out: first, 
the period from 1947 to about 1980, when growth was relatively slow and policies were 
aimed at import substitution and “self-sufficiency”, with government taking a lead role in the 
economy and controlling much private sector activity. The period was generally 
characterized by macroeconomic stability, in the sense of low inflation and fiscal discipline, 
although “foreign exchange shortage” and fluctuations in agricultural output due primarily to 
weather variations led to output volatility. 
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      The second period, starting around 1980, macroeconomic policy became more 
expansionary, some controls on the economy were removed, and the growth rate 
accelerated.
3 Underlying economic policies toward the private sector and the role of 
government in the economy were basically unchanged, although some efforts were made to 
reduce the “inefficiency” of controls. 
  By 1991, however, the unsustainability of the 1980s policy stance became evident, as 
a balance of payments crisis ensued. At that time (unlike an earlier crisis in 1966), reforms 
were undertaken in a number of policy arenas that cumulatively have changed the overall 
thrust of economic policy as well as the structure and growth trajectory of the Indian 
economy. That third period continues to the present day, as indeed, the growth rate has 
accelerated over the past few years. 
  Table 1 gives some data. Real GDP grew between 3 and 4 percent annually from the 
early 1950s through the 1970s; with population growth at around 2 percent, that implied an 
annual rate of percapita income growth of between 1 and 2 percent. Growth then accelerated 
to average 5.6 percent in the decade of the l980s and to 6.1 percent in the l990s, if the crisis 
year of 1991/92 is omitted from the calculations. Growth has accelerated still further thus far 
in the 21
st century, averaging 6.3 percent through 2005/6, with every prospect that growth in 
2006/7 will raise that average still further. 
  Reforms have encompassed a wide range of government policies. The foreign trade 
regime was significantly overhauled, as virtually all quantitative restrictions on imports have 
                                                 
3 Virmani (2005) finds no statistically significant difference between growth rates in the 
l980s and l990s, although all observers agree that the l980s growth, fueled as it was by large 
fiscal deficits and current account deficits, was unsustainable. 
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been removed, most tariffs have been significantly reduced,
4 and the exchange control 
regime for current account transactions has been dismantled. Monetary policy has shifted 
toward more reliance on incentives and prudential regulation, although there remains a 
considerable amount of directed credit in the system. Many controls over private sector 
activity have either been entirely eliminated (including requirements for multiple licenses for 
undertaking virtually any economic activity
5 – see the discussion below about the “organized 
sector”) or at least significantly reduced in scope, and there has been increased recognition of 
the role of the private sector on the part of politicians and officials. 
      Even small-scale reservation (SSR), a hallmark of earlier policies and one to which 
attention returns below, has been significantly reduced in coverage. The role of the Indian 
government in controlling private sector activity has been considerably reduced, and that 
reduction has been an important contributor to the improved overall performance of the 
Indian economy. 
  Two types of controls, however, have hardly been touched. These are the regulations 
governing the employment of labor in the “organized sector” of the economy and the various 
bureaucratic approvals that “organized” businesses must obtain. We return to these “missing 
                                                 
4 The highest Indian tariff is now 35 percent. This contrasts with tariffs of upwards of 200 
percent (with quantitative restrictions as well) prior to the start of reforms. Nonetheless, 
tariffs are still high by Asian standards. 
5 There was even a “capacity license”, which stated the enterprise’s  output “capacity”. Firms 
were initially prohibited from producing more than their licensed capacity, then they were 
permitted to produce a specified proportion over the licensed amount, and finally, the system 
was abandoned. 
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reforms” below, as those regulations undoubtedly account for a significant, if not a 
predominant, part of the “missing middle”. 
     During the first two periods, until 1991, Indian economic growth appeared to follow a 
fairly normal path, under which growth, while slow, was shared between the three major 
sectors – agriculture, industry and services – of economic activity. An overview of this 
pattern can be seen in Table 1. After the early years in which agriculture appeared to 
constitute a significant bottleneck, agriculture performed relatively well as the green 
revolution enabled a significant increase in agricultural productivity and output. 
     And, as happened in most other countries (see Table 2 for comparative data), industry 
grew at a rate above agriculture and services. So, while real GDP grew at around 3.5-4 
percent annually, the industrial growth rate was above 5 percent. Even in the l980s, when real 
GDP growth began accelerating, industrial output grew at  7.2 percent, services at 6.7 
percent, and agriculture at 3.7 percent (overall growth averaged 5.6 percent during this 
period). 
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Table 2 Behavior of Sectoral Shares as Economies Grew, 1820-1992 
    U.S.       France     Germany      UK       Japan      China      Russia 
    Share  of  Agriculture  in  GDP 
1820    70.0     n.a.             n.a.           37.6       n.a.            n.a.         n.a. 
1870    50.0   49.2          49.5           22.7       70.1            n.a.         n.a. 
1913    27.5   41.1          34.6    11.7       60.1            n.a.         n.a. 
1950    12.9   28.3            22.2      5.1       48.3           77.0       46.0 
1992      2.8        5.1              3.1             2.2        6.4            58.6        17.0 
 
    Share of Mining, Manufacturing, Construction and Utilities 
1820    15.0       n.a.              n.a.           32.9          n.a.  n.a.     n.a. 
1870    24.4   27.8            28.7           42.3          n.a.  n.a.     n.a. 
1913    29.7      32.3            41.1           44.1        17.5            n.a.         n.a. 
1950    33.6   34.9            43.0           44.9        22.6            7.0        29.0 
1992    23.3   28.1            37.8           26.2        34.6           22.0       36.0 
 
   Share  of  Services 
1820    15.9     n.a.             n.a.            29.5         n.a.           n.a.         n.a. 
1870    25.6      23.0           21.8         35.0         n.a.           n.a.         n.a. 
1912    42.8      26.6            24.3             44.2        22.4           n.a.         n.a. 
1950    53.5   36.8            34.8             50.0        29.1          16.0       25.0 
1992    74.0      66.8            59.1             71.6        59.0          20.0       47.0        
Source: Maddison (1995), P. 39. 
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     In the most recent period, however, the growth of services has accelerated markedly while 
that of the manufacturing sector has slowed from its 1981/81-1991/92 pace. With more rapid 
overall growth, one would have expected an acceleration of growth within the industrial 
sector, but instead it has lagged well behind what might have been expected. To confound 
matters further, the agricultural growth may have decelerated (weather fluctuations in India 
are still sufficiently important that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of weather vagaries 
from longer term trends). 
      Historically, all countries embarking on rapid growth have initially and for a prolonged 
period of time experienced an increased share of output and employment in manufacturing 
and other industrial activities. At first, this increased share came despite rising populations in 
agriculture but, as growth continued, the share of the population in agriculture declined, and 
later the agricultural population declined in absolute numbers as well. As the economic 
historian, Rondo Cameron, noted 
    “One of the most obvious differences between preindustrial and modern industrial 
societies is the greatly diminished relative role of agriculture in the latter. The counterpart of 
its diminished importance, however, is the increased productivity of modern 
agriculture…During the period of industrialization proper, extending roughly from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century (in Great Britain) to the first half of the twentieth 
century, the characteristic feature of the structural transformation of the economy was the rise 
of the secondary sector…observable in the proportion of both the labor force employed and 
the output.” (Cameron, P. 163) 
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     Cameron notes that shifting workers from agriculture to industry was itself growth-
enhancing as productivity in manufacturing was typically higher than in agriculture; 
simultaneously, agricultural productivity had to rise in order to release workers and that 
meant that average productivity in agriculture rose. 
        Table 2 gives data on the shares of agriculture, manufacturing, and services in other 
economies during their rapid growth periods. The 19
th century pattern has been followed by 
more recent rapidly-industrializing economies. In South Korea, for example, the share of 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries in GNP and employment fell respectively from 43.1 and 
63.4 percent in 1963 (the start of Korea’s rapid growth years) to 14.9 and 34.0 percent in 
1980 and 7.1 and 13.6 percent in 1994 (Moon and Sul, P. 470). 
        Table 3 provides evidence to the same effect for the recent growth of several Asian 
countries for the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. As can be seen, even in the 1990s, 
the only developing Asian countries that were sufficiently advanced to experience a declining 
share of employment in manufacturing were Taiwan and South Korea. But the increase in the 
share of manufacturing employment in India was a miniscule 0.3 per cent – far below what 
other countries experienced during their rapid growth years. 
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Table 3. Change in the Sectoral Shares of employment 
 
Country                      1971-80                     l980-81                         l 990-2000 
                            Ag     Mfg   Serv.           Ag  Mfg   Serv               Ag  Mfg   Serv 
 
R of Korea       -14.4    8.3       6.0           -17.3  5.0   12.9              -7.6   -6.7   14.5 
Taiwan,China   -15.6  11.1      3.7            - 6.6  1.7     8.9               -5.0   -4.1     9.2 
Thailand            - 1.4    0.3      1.7            -10.5  3.2    7.3              -15.3    4.3   10.2 
Malaysia           -14.8    6.1      9.9            -10.4  4.6    6.6              - 7.9     2.9     3.0 
Philippines         - 1.4  -0.7      2.1             - 6.2  -0.6   6.7               -7.8     0.3     7.6 
Indonesia             n.a.   n.a.      n.a.             -2.7   1.3   1.1               -9.9     2.8     7.1 
India                   -5.5   1.8       3.0               -4.6   0.0  3.4                -3.6     0.3     2.4 
 
Source: Mazumdar, 2006 
     The estimated Indian elasticity of employment with respect to real GDP was 0.53 for 
1977-78 to l983, 0.41 for l983 to l993-4, and 0.15 for the period from 1993-4 to 1999-2000.
6 
For manufacturing alone, the figures for the same periods were 0.67, 0.33, and 0.26. Indeed, 
in the 9
th Five Year Plan, an elasticity of employment with respect to manufacturing output 
                                                 
6 Government of India, 2001, Table 3.1, P. 46. The elasticity of employment with respect to 
GNP is a descriptive statistic: it is the outcome of changes in both the supply of, and the 
demand for, labor. In countries (such as Japan) where the labor force is no longer growing 
and there is little unemployment, the elasticity of employment with respect to output must be 
close to zero, and productivity growth must carry the entire burden of economic growth. But, 
in countries with large rural populations, it is to be expected that the elasticity of employment 
with respect to output would be considerably higher. 
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of 0.25 was used, and the Task Force estimated that, going forward, the elasticity would be 
0.22. With elasticities such as these, manufacturing is unlikely to make a major contribution 
to employment growth. Even in business services, the Task Force estimated that the elasticity 
of employment with respect to output was only 0.73, and would decline to 0.50 going 
forward.  
      These numbers only provide a description of the average relationship between output and 
employment growth. But should these averages continue to hold and if the Indian labor force 
grows at 2 percent annually (as it should with the “demographic dividend”), real GDP growth 
would have to be at least 10 percent to absorb new entrants, and even that would not enable a 
“normal” rate of shift of the labor force out of agriculture. 
      By World Bank
7 estimates, industrial output in India fell from 28 percent of GDP in 1990 
to 27 percent of GDP in 2004. By contrast, Chinese industrial output rose from 42 to 46 
percent of GDP over the same period. While there is nothing that says that the Indian 
economy should develop along the same lines as the Chinese, nor anything that indicates that 
the Chinese pattern is “optimal”, it is not more rapid growth of services in India that explains 
the difference: Indian services are estimated to have grown from 41 to 52 percent of GDP 
while Chinese services grew from 31 t o 41 percent. The difference arises from the slower 
growth of industrial output and employment in India than in China. 
       Moreover, not only has manufacturing output not risen as rapidly as might have been 
expected, employment in the manufacturing sector has grown very slowly. This can be seen 
in Table 4. Industrial and manufacturing output has increased (as seen in Table 1), but it has 
                                                 
7 World Bank (2006), Table 4.1, pp. 194-5. 
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come about through increasing the capital intensity of manufacturing industry, and few 
additional workers have been hired. Indeed, overall industrial employment in the 1994-2000 
(post reform) period grew at an average annual rate of only 0.98 percent – below the rate of 
growth of the labor force.  
Table 4 Estimate of Total and Organized Sector Employment 
Sector             Employment (millions)                  Growth Rate (% per year) 
                       1983      l988     l994    l999-00               l983-94   l994-2000 
 
Population         718      790      895      1,004                      2.12      1.93 
Labor Force       309      349      382         406                      2.05      1.03 
Employment      303      324      374         397                      2.04      0.98 
 
    Of which: Organized Sector Employment: 
        Total             24       26        27           28                       l.20       0.53 
     Public sector    16       18        19           19                      1.52      -0.03 
     Private sector     8         7          8             9                      0.45       1.87 
 
Source: Government of India, Planning Commission, Report of the Task Force on 
Employment Opportunities, July 200l, P. 35. 
Note: growth rates computed from data rounded to the nearest l0,000.  
      Table 5 gives additional data. Although industrial output has grown at an average annual 
rate of over 6 percent, employment in production activities grew at only 2.8 percent over the 
period since 1983, and at 2.3 percent in the years up to 2000. Although later data are sparse, 
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there is little to indicate that the rate of growth of employment in the industrial sector  has 
accelerated.   And the sluggish growth of employment is even more dramatic in the 
“organized sector”, as seen in Table 4. Enterprises with more than 10 workers are supposed 
to register with the government, and are regarded as the “organized sector” of the economy.  
The “organized sector” is subject to government regulations regarding many aspects of 
economic activity (including more stringent labor regulation) that do not apply to firms 
outside the sector. Enterprises that are not “organized” need not be “informal” if they are 
sufficiently small; but, in fact, it is widely thought that there are many enterprises with more 
than 10 workers that are not “organized”.  
  15  - 16 - 
Table 5. Structural Changes in Employment According to    
Weekly Status 
Millions of Workers                  Annual Average Percent Growth 
        1983     l993-4      l999-2000           1983-93/4    93/4-99/00  l983-2000 
Total labor force    263        346           368              2.6            l.0             2.0 
    Ages 15-59         229       311            334              2.9            1.2             2.1 
 
Agricultural             142      183             181                         2.4           -0.2             1.5 
      Cultivators           79        96               90              1.8           -1.0              0.8 
      Other farmers        8        14               14                         5.3            0.2              3.4 
      Ag. Laborers        49       65               69              2.7            1.1               2.1 
 
Nonagricultural          86       122           141              3.3             2.4               3.0 
      Production            43         59             68              3.1             2.3               2.8 
      Service                 10         11             14                          1.5            3.6                2.3 
      Unpaid, self-      122       160           166                          2.6            0.6     1.9 
          employed 
   
Source: Bhalla, P. 2. 
     The failure of manufacturing employment of unskilled workers to grow has, in turn, 
resulted in the continuing high share of rural population and agricultural employment in the 
total. As can be seen, the percentage point shift into services in China was about the same as 
in India; but Chinese agricultural employment fell much more rapidly than Indian, as 
manufacturing output and employment grew much more rapidly. 
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      This phenomenon raises two questions. The first is whether the Indian pattern is simply 
the result of India’s comparative advantage, so that India could “skip” the rapid-
manufacturing-growth phase of development. The second is why Indian manufacturing 
employment has grown so slowly. 
3. Indian Comparative Advantage
       In principle, it is conceivable that India’s comparative advantage could be such that India 
should skip the manufacturing phase that has accompanied other countries’ economic 
development. The success of services, and their rapid growth, has suggested this hypothesis 
to many observers. 
      But the fact is that, despite its great success, the rapidly-growing services (finance, 
insurance, real estate and business services) accounted for only around 12 percent of output 
in 2000-2001.
8 Their share of employment would have been significantly smaller. 
      Moreover, most of the rapidly growing business services – BPO, software development 
and engineering, and the like – primarily employ educated and skilled workers and are 
unlikely to generate very much incremental demand for unskilled labor.
9
      In the development process historically, relatively unskilled farm workers migrated to the 
cities, and found initial employment in manufacturing in jobs with little skill content. The 
experience thus gained enabled many to “graduate” to somewhat more skilled jobs, while 
their children’s educational attainment in the urban areas exceeded that of the migrants. 
                                                 
8 Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2003, Table h3. 
9 Even call centers require personnel with a good foreign language (predominantly English) 
and enough technical education to respond to callers’ queries. 
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Given the vast numbers of those in low-productivity occupations in rural areas, it seems 
evident that growth enabling a much more rapid absorption of unskilled labor into more 
productive activities should be part of India’s normal growth process. 
      In turn, the rapid development of unskilled-labor intensive manufacturing would almost 
surely be associated with the rapid development of export markets for part of the output. As 
the Chinese success has indicated, the market is there, and there is no reason to believe that 
Indian companies producing unskilled labor-intensive products could not compete 
internationally given the appropriate setting. 
      Most observers note that, over the next quarter century or so, India will have the 
advantage of a “demographic dividend”. That is, at a time when much of the rest of the world 
(including China) will experience rapid population aging and a slowly-growing or even 
declining labor force,  India should benefit significantly from the fact that her labor force will 
grow both as a percentage of the population and absolutely. By the mid-century this 
advantage will, on present trends, have evaporated, but in the interim it should serve to 
enhance India’s development prospects. But, unless the factors leading to the failure of 
unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing output and employment to grow more rapidly are 
understood, and policies undertaken to change the trends significantly, the demographic 
dividend will instead result in more poor people left outside of the “good” industrial jobs. 
4.  Why Manufacturing’s Poor Relative Performance?
      One of the problems of social science in general is that one cannot observe a “counter-
factual”. In particular, firms that were not started, or did not grow, cannot be seen. In 
consequence, much analysis of why manufacturing is “missing” must rely on experience and 
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lessons from other countries, and from a priori analysis of the  environment in which 
economic activity has, or would have, taken place in India. 
      One of the properties of unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing seems to be that, for 
many products, mass production is economic: reports of Chinese factories with l0,000 
workers are not uncommon, many of them undertaking similar repetitive tasks. As will be 
seen, India’s business and labor regulation serves as a major deterrent to mass production: 
firms that have remained small have been rewarded, while it is not possible to produce the 
sorts of large quantities needed for competing internationally without being in the organized 
sector of the economy.  
       At the same time, historically it has been rare (but not unheard of) for a business to start 
up on a large scale. More frequently, many small entrepreneurs have started activities; a 
number of them are sufficiently successful to expand; and a few become large as they are 
enabled to learn their markets and improve productive efficiency with experience. In India’s 
case, this consideration is important, because the provisions of the Small Scale Reservation 
(SSR) law provided large incentives for small scale enterprises to remain small.
10 At the 
same time, the regulations governing organized sector activities must have constituted, and 
                                                 
10 The SSR law was enacted in the early days of Indian planning: it listed a number of 
industries (over l,000 at its peak) which were “reserved” for small-scale industries (existing 
producers in these industries that were larger than the legal maximum were grandfathered, 
but entry at large scale was prohibited. Small-scale firms in those industries were entitled to 
exemption from many of the legal requirements governing large-scale enterprises and to 
receive favorable treatment in taxes and other matters. But reservation implied that even 
highly successful firms could not grow. In practice, an entrepreneur could evade the law to 
some extent by putting names of relatives on businesses which were in fact jointly operated. 
Nonetheless, reservation surely inhibited the expansion of small scale firms and the 
development of exports of precisely the goods in which India’s abundance of unskilled labor 
would have given her a comparative advantage.  See Mohan (2001) for a full account. 
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almost certainly still constitute, a deterrent to expanding activities sufficiently to have to 
become organized. 
      There are two broad categories of factors that are almost certainly major contributors to 
the failure of manufacturing output and employment to grow more rapidly.
11 On one hand, 
there are the regulations governing enterprises in the private sector; on the other, there are 
regulations covering conditions of employment of labor. Each of these has no doubt 
contributed to the failure of unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing to grow more rapidly. 
And there is also very likely a strong interaction between the two: if labor regulations were 
less stringent, some firms would doubtless emerge and prosper that do not even begin in the 
current environment. But the fact of regulation of business is an added deterrent, and further 
reduces incentives for starting or expanding businesses. 
       Regulations Governing Business. In all countries, some registration is required of 
business activities, and regulation of some aspects of activity is deemed desirable. But when 
the processes for doing this are unnecessarily cumbersome or require considerable time, the 
effects on economic activity can be severe. 
       In the case of India, there is no question but that delays and unnecessary requirements 
raise the costs of all firms. But they are more onerous for small firms and potential new 
entrants, both because the costs are spread over a smaller volume of economic activity and 
                                                 
11 All knowledgeable observers of India will immediately protest that there is another factor, 
not considered here: infrastructure bottlenecks. While that has no doubt been a significant 
deterrent to start-ups and expansion of manufacturing activities, it is not the only one. 
Moreover, had the factors discussed in this section been more conducive to private economic 
activity, there would probably have been significantly more pressure to enhance 
infrastructure. 
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because small enterprises and potential new entrants have less experience of dealing with 
them. 
     The reforms since 1991 have reduced the burden of red tape and bureaucracy to a 
considerable extent, but India still ranks well down the list of countries whose regulatory 
climate is “business friendly”. In the World Bank’s rating of countries, India ranked 102 in 
2005 and 88 in 2006 in the “ease of starting a business”. Eleven procedures to do so were 
necessary as of the end of 2006, while it required 35 days (down from 89 in 2004) and cost 
about three quarters of per capita income.
12  On those numbers, the World Bank ranked India 
88 out of the 175 countries in terms of the difficulties of starting a business. It will be seen 
below that India has an unusual distribution of firms by size. One reason is surely the 
difficulty of starting a new business, which deters start-ups. 
      The very fact of multiple bureaucratic regulations and licenses surrounding economic 
activity was and is doubtless a negative. India’s panoply of licensing, controls and 
regulations certainly raised costs for existing firms, and probably disproportionately so for 
smaller firms and potential entrants. 
      No one in India doubts that the high costs of compliance with regulation are a major 
factor accounting for the failure of the organized sector to grow and for the large size of the 
unorganized sector. An indication of the extent of the difficulties (which are now far less than 
they were 15 years ago) may also be gleaned from the reports of the World Bank. Of 175 
countries included in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report for 2006, India ranked overall 
134
th. This low ranking reflects a significantly less warm welcome and less friendly business 
                                                 
12 International Finance Corporation, “Doing Business”, 2006. 
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environment for firms than in most other countries. Since difficulties in doing business raise 
costs as well as deter foreign investment, the regulatory environment is certainly a factor 
accounting for at least part of the missing middle. 
     And, despite reforms which have certainly improved the situation, dealing with licenses is 
still seen as a major problem in India. Again according to the World Bank’s numbers, India 
in 2006 ranked 155 out of l75 in the degree of difficulty businesses have in “dealing with 
licenses”. According to the World Bank’s estimates, there were 20 procedures, taking 270 
days, and costing over 600 percent of per capita income for an Indian business to comply 
with required licensing procedures. By contrast, Korea in 2006 was ranked 28
th, with 14 
procedures, requiring 52 days and costing less than twice per capita income.  
      India ranks fairly well in investor protection (33
rd of 175), but shows up poorly (173
rd of 
175) in contract enforcement (with an estimated 56 procedures requiring 1,420 days and 
costing 36 percent of the debt a creditor is trying to collect). Likewise, India ranks poorly 
(139
th of 175) in the degree of difficulty in trading across borders. Since development of 
unskilled-labor-intensive manufacturing would surely involved exporting some of the output, 
this is especially important in assessing prospects for remedying the “missing middle”, and 
would certainly stand as a deterrent to potential entrants to exporting labor-intensive 
manufactures. 
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       Ten documents are required for export, and they take an estimated 27 days, with a cost 
of US$864 per container (compared to 6 documents for China, taking 18 days, with a cost of 
US$335 per container).
13
      In 1950, it was decreed that firms employing more than 10 workers should be in the 
“organized” sector of the economy. These firms would register as “organized”, and then be 
subject to the rules (and privileges) governing organized sector activity. These rules pertain 
to many things: regulations governing employment of workers (to be discussed below), 
provision of pensions and other social safety net items for employees, taxes, and much more. 
Until the reforms, firms in the organized sector had to have “capacity licenses”, indicating 
the maximum permissible amount of production, and their licenses indicated as well such 
parameters as the types of products to be produced, the number of shifts that could be 
operated, and so on. 
     While some of these restrictions have been lifted, there still remains an “organized” sector 
of the economy. Table 4 gives data on the size of the organized sector’s employment and its 
growth rate. As can be seen,  total organized sector employment in 1999-2000 was only 28 
million out of  a labor force of 406 million, and  of that total, 19 million organized sector 
workers were in the public sector. Only 9 million workers, less than 3 percent of the labor 
force were in the organized private sector! Moreover, the organized sector had experienced 
employment growth of just over a half a percent annually from 1994-2000. To be sure, part 
                                                 
13 In some cases, India’s procedures have been streamlined, but so have procedures in other 
countries. For example, the time to export in India fell from 36 to 27 days between 2003 and 
2006, but in China it fell from 20 to 18 days. 
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of that slow growth was attributable to a slight decline in public sector employment, but even 
in the organized private sector, employment grew at a rate of only 1.87 percent annually. 
      Of course, there are many firms with more than 10 employees that have not registered as 
organized. In some instances, they operate as one larger firm and do not register; in other 
cases, factories have office doors with different names on each one in order to keep under the 
limit of ten! It is apparently not uncommon for the ground floor of a building to have several 
dozen doors, each with the name of a firm on it, all firms producing the same good and 
owned by members of the same family.
14
      For some purposes, the fact that firms remain in the informal sector may not be 
important. However, if a producer wanted to export (or even to explore whether he could 
profitably export on a large scale), the necessary size and the required paperwork would 
almost certainly require being “organized”. The fact that the hurdles to being organized, and 
the costs of compliance with existing regulations governing organized activity, leave so 
many in the unorganized sector is itself evidence that requirements are a deterrent to the 
development of many things, but perhaps especially unskilled labor-intensive manufactures 
(which can, probably in most cases less economically, be produced at smaller scale). 
       This is reflected in the size distribution of firms in India: in the 1980s, over 40 percent of 
manufacturing employment was reported in firms with 5-9 workers, and almost another 30 
percent in firms with more than 500 workers. Enterprises with 10-49, 50-99, 100-199, and 
                                                 
14 World Bank, 2006a, P. 122. 
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200-499 workers each employed less than 10 percent of manufacturing workers. By contrast, 
Korea and Malaysia reported fewer than 5 percent of manufacturing employees in firms with 
5-9 workers, and over 20 percent in firms with 10-40 employees.
15 Although these data are 
from the l980s, all the evidence, including the failure of organized sector employment to 
grow, points to the conclusion that the requirements for achieving organized sector status 
serve as a  major deterrent to firms’ expansion, unless they can do so and remain outside its 
purview. While for many purposes that is probably possible, it surely puts a very high hurdle 
for labor-intensive activities, especially as exporting is virtually impossible without 
undertaking the paperwork that would require organized sector status. 
       Small-Scale Reservation
         As already indicated, in an attempt to protect small-scale enterprises the GOI enacted a 
Small Scale Reservation (SSR) law which reserved a large number (over l,000 at its peak) of 
manufacturing activities to small scale enterprises. These activities were the ones generally 
thought to be intensive in the use of unskilled labor. In activities designed as SSR, larger 
firms were enjoined from entering production (although existing firms were grandfathered 
and could continue) and a number of measures were enacted to provide subsidies and tax 
advantages to SS firms. 
        Since expansion would entail the loss of these subsidies and advantages, another barrier 
to successful development of the unskilled-labor-intensive industries was erected. Whatever 
                                                 
15 World Bank, 2006a, P. 122. 
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the intent of the measure, it effectively precluded the rapid growth of these industries, as they 
could not remain small and enter into competition in international markets. 
       In the cases of very rapidly growing counties in the past half century, rapid growth of 
output and employment in unskilled labor-intensive manufacturing has been a major engine 
of growth. It has been possible because firms could expand production and employment not 
only to supply the domestic market, but also to export part of their output. Those exports 
were profitable because of countries’ comparative advantage in unskilled labor-intensive 
activities and commensurately low costs (relative to higher-wage, more advanced 
economies), and that in turn spurred output expansion, learning, and productivity growth.  
       With India’s abundant supply of unskilled labor, able entrepreneurs and historical track 
record in industries such as textiles and clothing, footwear, and other labor-intensive 
industries, one would have expected rapid expansion and exports from these industries.  But 
growth has been small relative to that experienced by other countries. Small-scale 
reservation, combined with the difficulties of becoming “organized” surely accounts for 
some of the missing middle. 
      For exporting firms need to be of sufficient size to be able to invest in learning about 
foreign markets, learning the appropriate quality control and other procedures, and meeting 
foreigners’ needs with respect to standardization, quality, and timely delivery. For firms 
under reservation, the uncertainties (and the rewards) of the export market would have 
remained unknown, and investigating them would, in most cases, have required the 
abandonment of the (certain) special privileges received by SSR firms before they could have 
  26  - 27 - 
expanded and learned enough about the (uncertain) international market to be reasonably 
confident of success. 
         While it is certainly true that firms found ways to combine operations while retaining 
access to the privileges of SSR in some cases, those ways would, in the first place, have 
raised costs for them. In addition, the paperwork, formalities, and requirements of exporting 
would generally have required sufficient scale that SSR status would have precluded it.
16
     The GOI began removing SSR status from unskilled labor-intensive industries in 2003. 
From over 1,000 items reserved for SS, there now remain 308 such items (as of February 
2007). It is early days for the newly released economic activities to form a judgment of how 
much of an impetus this will give to expansion of output of goods that are intensive unskilled 
labor using in the production process. One would have to surmise that many small firms have 
been small for so long that significant expansion is not contemplated. However, other new 
entrants may emerge and grow, and India’s size distribution of firms may become more 
normal over time. 
Labor Market Regulation
      Taken together, the requirements for being “organized”, the difficulties of doing business 
if organized, and the privileges accorded to SSR, surely explain a lot of the “missing 
middle”. But, regulations governing the employment of labor surely play a role as well. As 
stated by the World Bank,  
                                                 
16 See Rakesh Mohan (2001) for a thorough analysis of the effects of SSR. 
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      “Restrictive labor laws thus end up creating a bias to protect the already employed formal 
sector workers at the expense of creating more and better jobs for workers outside the formal 
manufacturing sector or encouraging firms to enter the formal sector. These laws create 
massive inequality. They divide a tiny enclave of relatively better-paid salaried formal sector 
workers, who have good job security and benefits, from the vast majority of informal or 
unorganized sector workers, who work for much lower wages and with little or no social 
protection…” (World Bank, 2006b, P. 123). 
       It is difficult, if not impossible, for an enterprise to fire workers, either for cause or 
because they are no longer needed. The law gives unions very strong bargaining power, and 
is reported to be a significant deterrent to hiring unskilled workers if machines can do the 
job. Requirements for workers’ health and pensions further increase the hurdles. 
       Output and investment have grown in the organized sector of the Indian economy, but 
employment has not, at least until very recently.
17 Even for those firms which are in the 
organized sector, it seems to be a deliberate choice to avoid hiring more workers. This 
suggests that the requirements of labor laws that affect the organized sector are onerous.
18
                                                 
17 Data are available only with a lag. Even then, there is considerable uncertainty as to the 
interpretation of the data. See Srinivasan (2006). 
18 Several economists with whom I spoke protested that “but Indian firms have learned to 
live with these laws and do not complain”.  That is of course true of  those firms which are 
organized and have survived. But their failure to expand employment, and the failure of other 
firms to emerge, surely suggests that incentives for hiring unskilled labor are less attractive 
than they might be. 
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     Differences in productivity between the informal and formal sectors are estimated to be 
large. The World Bank reports that Mazumdar has estimated the labor productivity of 
informal sector firms to be about one-fifth that of the formal sector. To the extent that this 
results from capital-deepening in the formal sector, as would seem to be the case given the 
failure of employment to grow, it would suggest that an alternative growth path, with a  
higher labor-capital ratio, would have benefited those workers who would have obtained 
employment, firms, and exports, and enabled a higher level of output. 
      From all reports, firms in the unorganized sector of the economy largely escape the 
effects of labor regulations. Wages in the unorganized sector are significantly below those in 
the organized sector, although the World Bank reports that there is little evidence of any 
significant difference in wages between urban and rural informal workers. The distortion in 
the labor market would appear to be between the organized sector and the rest, and not 
between urban and rural.
19
5. Conclusions
     India’s success from 1991 to date has contrasted sharply with the sluggish earlier 
performance of the economy, and there is much with which to be pleased. One cannot, 
however, completely escape the worry that that success may lull policy makers into 
complacency, and deter them from undertaking further reforms that could bring millions out 
of low-productivity agriculture into unskilled-labor intensive manufacturing and related 
                                                 
19 World Bank 2006b, P. 123. 
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activities. The rapid growth of that sector would enable even more rapid growth than has 
been achieved up until now.  While such a development would increase the demands placed 
on Indian infrastructure, those needs would be important in any event. Moreover, were the 
nonagricultural employment numbers to increase more rapidly, that would immediately 
imply a more rapid rate of increase in labor productivity in agriculture, although measures 
would need to be taken to raise agricultural productivity in any event.
20
     Given the demographic dividend that India can expect over the next several decades, 
measures to enable the more rapid absorption of unskilled labor into the manufacturing sector 
are urgently needed. The evident place to begin is with a reduction in the barriers to entry    
to unskilled labor manufacturing, and a relaxation of some of the most restrictive labor laws. 
      Should India be successful in the development of competitive, exporting, unskilled labor-
intensive-activities, prospects for a rate of growth even more rapid than that of the past four 
years would be greatly enhanced. 
 
                                                 
20 It is beyond the scope of this essay, but there are plausible reasons to believe that Indian 
agriculture’s comparative advantage should lie in labor-intensive crops – such as vegetables 
– and less in the land intensive grains that constitute the major agricultural outputs at the 
present time. This, too, would increase living standards in rural areas. 
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